Based on eBay auctions of classic comic books, we explore what attracts bidders to individual online auctions. Seventy percent of the variation in the number of bidders across auctions is predictable based on characteristics of the item for sale, the seller, and the auction design. Not surprisingly, high minimum bids discourage bidders while longer auctions attract slightly more. We also find that the presence of a secret reserve price sharply reduces the number of bidders while third party certification attracts more. Seller reputation as measured by feedback ratings has a statistically significant impact on the number of bidders. Overall, our results support the hypotheses that bidding is fairly costly and that bidders value transparency.
Introduction
Online auctions play an increasing role in the United States economy. According to a 2003 ISM / Forrester Research report, 72% of business respondents purchased goods or services on the Internet and 25% did so through an Internet auction. 42% of firms buying more than $100 million per year used online auctions for some purchases. Sales on eBay totaled almost $21.5 billion in the first half of 2005.
Based on a sample of over 5000 eBay auctions of classic comic books, this paper explores what attracts bidders to a specific on-line auction and the impact on the price received by the seller of an additional bidder. The number of bidders varies widely in comic book auctions. In our data set 20.4% of the auctions fail to attract a single bidder while 21.8% attract eight or more. We find that over seventy percent of the variation in the number of bidders across individual auctions is predictable based on characteristics of the comic, the seller, and the auction design. Not surprisingly, high minimum bids discourage bidders. In addition, the presence of a secret reserve price strongly discourages bidding. All 1 other things equal, we find that the number of bidders is sharply lower on auctions with reserve prices -by about 1.6 bidders on average. While secret reserve prices scare off bidders, we find they have little impact on what individual bidders are willing to bid. The claimed condition or grade of the comic has a significant impact on the number of bidders but a much larger impact on what they are willing to bid. On the other hand, certification of the claimed grade by a rating agency strongly impacts both the number of bidders (attracting roughly one more bidder on average) and their individual bids. Both the number of bidders and their bid amounts are significantly impacted by the reputation of the seller as reflected in feedback ratings.
Money back guarantees attract slightly more bidders (roughly .3) while failure to provide a scan discourages bidders (roughly .5). Not surprisingly, longer auctions attract more bidders with a 10 day auction attracting about .7 more bidders than a ten day auction.
Overall, our results support the hypothesis that bidding is costly since bidders seem to restrict their bidding to auctions in which the likelihood of success is higher. As evidenced by the fact that they avoid auctions with secret reserve prices and flock to auctions where the claimed condition or grade of the comic is certified by a third party, bidders also appear to strongly prefer fully transparent auctions.
Holding issue, seller, and auction characteristics constant, we find that the arrival of an additional bidder is associated with an increase in the final price of between 2.3% and 4.2%. In common value auctions, if bidders fully adjust for winners' curse and the number of competing bidders is known, then an increase in the number of bidders (beyond two) should not impact the price since existing bidders should reduce their bids to adjust for the increased likelihood that the winning bidder has over-estimated the value of the item. Our finding that the price increases with the number of bidders suggest that either 1) comics are partially a private value item, 2) bidders do not fully adjust for bidders curse, and/or 3) bidders cannot fully predict the number of competing bidders.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly describe the comic book market and eBay auctions and review the relevant literature. In section 3, we describe our data.
In 4, we develop our empirical tests of the determinants of the number of bidders. Results are presented in section 5. In 6 we explore the impact of the number of bidders on the price. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Collectible Comics and eBay Auctions.

The Market for Collectible Comic Books.
This paper investigates bidder behavior in the on-line auction market for collectible comics books from what is generally referred to as comics' "Silver Age", the period from 1956-1969 when super heroes, such as Spider-Man, ruled supreme. This is the most active collectible comics market. For instance, on August 16, 2004, eBay had 17,176 auctions underway in Silver Age comics, versus 5,409 for comics published before 1956 and 14,216 for comics published from [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] . Since the comic's condition is a major determinant of its price, the marketplace has established a grading structure recognizing 24 grades according to such characteristics as tears, creases, paper condition, cover gloss and condition of the spine.
grades as Fine+, Fine-, and Fine/Very Fine round out the 24 grades. Traditionally, dealers price Good and Fine comic books at roughly 10% and 25% respectively of the price of a Near Mint book.
In an Internet auction (or mail order sale) the would-be-buyer is obviously at a greater informational disadvantage than in a dealer's shop since distance prevents the buyer from personally inspecting the book.
Hence, bidders must rely on some combination of the seller's reputation, possible warranties, scans and/or third party certification to resolve the quality uncertainty and avoid a lemons problem. As described in Dewally and Ederington (2006) , for a fee which ranges from $20 to $55, Comics Guarantee LLC (CGC) will grade and certify a comic. To maintain the integrity of its certification, CGC encases the comic in plastic.
Opening the casing invalidates the certification.
eBay Auctions.
The growth of the Internet, and eBay in particular, has transformed the markets for collectibles including classic comic books. On August 16, 2004 when over 17,000 Silver Age comic books were up for auction on eBay, Amazon's Silver Age category had 2,413 listings and Yahoo! 374 auctions. In designing an eBay auction, the seller sets four parameters: (1) the starting time and length of the auction (3, 5, 7 or 10 days), (2) the minimum acceptable bid, (3) the acceptable means of payment (money order, credit card, personal check), and (4) shipping charges if any. The seller can also include scans of the comic book, offer a money back guarantee, and/or set a secret reserve price (for a fee).
eBay auctions are variations of Vickrey's second price sealed bid auction in that the winner pays the second highest bid plus a set increment. Bidders choose a reservation price, and the eBay computer then enters the minimum bid (below this reservation price) which will lead the bidding. For example, suppose a seller posts an item with a minimum acceptable bid of $100. Suppose the first bidder, A, enters a reservation price of $110. The eBay computer posts A as the highest bidder at $100.00. If bidder B enters the bidding with a reservation price of $125, she becomes the high bidder at $112.50 -A's reservation price plus the preset $2.50 increment. If B had instead set a maximum of $105, A would have remained the high bidder at $107.50 -B's limit plus $2.50. Hence, the winner pays the reservation price of the second highest bidder plus a small increment. Given this pricing scheme, minimum bids and reserve prices essentially introduce an additional bidder into the process.
Previous Research.
Online auctions have been the subject of considerable research in recent years, (for excellent reviews see Hortaçsu, 2004, and Anandalingam et al, 2005) . While most have focused on the impact of seller and auction characteristics on the price received, most relevant for our study are those exploring determinants of the number of bidders. McDonald and Slawson (2002) bidders, results are mixed on the impact of a secret reserve price. Livingston finds that the propensity to bid is significantly higher when a reserve price is present. In Lucking-Reiley et al the estimated impact of a secret reserve on the number of bidders is positive but insignificant while in Bajari and Hortaçsu, it is negative but insignificant. This is surprising since our evidence indicates a very strong negative impact.
Evidence is also mixed on whether longer auctions attract more bidders. Lucking-Reiley et al find that they do while McDonald and Slawson find no significant difference. To our knowledge, no one has examined whether third-party certification or money-back guarantee's attract more bidders or how the number of bidders varies with the claimed condition or grade and the predicted price.
An issue has been whether on-line bidding is costly. While there are no explicit costs to bidding on eBay, there could well be considerable time costs in researching the item and seller and dealing with sellers.
If costs are very low, then we should observe bidders entering all auctions in which the current high bid is below what they are willing to pay. If costly, they should only enter where the chance of success is reasonably high. Livingston's evidence supports the latter hypothesis.
A second issue we consider is how the entry of an additional bidder impacts the price received. This depends on both the nature of the item being auctioned and whether bidders fully adjust for winners curse.
If 1) the item being auctioned is a public value item (meaning that its value to all bidders is its market value), 2) bidders fully adjust for winner's curse, and 3) bidders know how many competitors they are bidding against, then the entry of a new bidder should not impact the final price. Briefly the reason is that as the number of bidders increases, the likelihood that the winning bidder over-estimates the value of the item rises. Thus, rational bidders should lower their bids as the number of competitors rises.
Winners curse has received considerable attention in the literature. Based on a structural econometric model, Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003) estimate that bidders bid 10% below their ex-ante estimate of the value of the collectible coin for sale. Consistent with adjustment for winner's curse, they estimate that the expectation of one additional bidder causes existing bidders to lower their bids by about 3.2%. Yin (2004) finds that successful eBay bidders paid more than the estimated value in only 9% of the auctions indicating that participants in computer auctions on eBay adjust for the winner's curse. Consistent with the other two studies, Jin and Kato (2002) find that in baseball card auctions bidders adjust their bids in an effort to avoid the winner's curse. Contrary to the other authors though, they conclude that this adjustment is insufficient to prevent winners from overpaying.
While extant empirical studies focus on whether individual bidders adjust their bids for winner's curse, we examine how the final auction price varies as the number of bidders increases. In common value auctions, as the number of bidders increases, existing bidders should lower their individual bids leaving the expected selling price unchanged. A finding that the price increases with the number of bidders indicates that either (1) the auctioned item has a private value component, (2) some bidders fail to fully adjust for winner's curse, or (3) bidders do not know when an additional bidder enters so fail to fully adjust.
Data
Data were collected on Ebay auctions of the 30 Silver Age comic books listed in Table 1 Characteristics of the 30 comics are reported in Table 1 .
The average price (which is based on the high bid if the secret reserve price is not met and excludes auctions with no bidders) is $390 but varies considerably as indicated by the standard deviation of $1143. In 28.4% of the auctions, the claimed quality of the comic is certified by Comics Guaranty Corporation. 15.3% include a money-back guarantee and 96.6% include a scan of the comic. In 29.4%, the seller sets a secret reserve price. 79.6% of the auctions attract at least one bidder and 61.9% result in a successful sale.
Bids and Bidders.
Descriptive Data.
In our sample the number of bids and bidders varies widely. The number of bidders averages 5.05 per auction and the median is 4. As shown in Table 2 , there is substantial variation. There are no bidders in 20.4% of the auctions and only 1 in 8.1%. On the other hand, there are ten or more bidders in 16.5% of the observed auctions and more than fifteen in 2.1%. Obviously a bidder may bid more than once. In our sample the mean number of bids is 8.27 and the median is 7. The bid distribution is also documented in Table 2 . The correlation between bids and bidders is .895.
Bidders and Auction Design.
We seek to determine what influences the number of bidders for an issue by regressing the number of bidders on characteristics of the auction, comic, and signals by the seller. The number of bidders and bids should be dependent on the minimum bid set by the seller. If on the same item, seller A sets a minimum bid of $10 and seller B a minimum bid of $100, a number of bids would normally be required to raise the going bid for A to the starting point for B. Hence it is important to control for the relationship between the minimum bid and the number of bidders before examining more interesting possible determinants. What should matter is the minimum bid as a fraction of the expected value of the comic. In our sample, the price ranges from a minimum of $1.62 to a maximum of $55,000.00. Much of this price variation is predictable based on the issue and the comic's condition. Books graded "near mint" sell for many times the price of similar books graded lower. As shown in Table 1 , price also varies considerably across our 30 comic books with the first issue of Spider-Man selling for many times the price of the 41 issue. st We estimate an approximate value of each comic based on the issue and claimed grade and then express the minimum bid as a fraction of this estimated value. For this, we regress the log of the comic's auction price (plus 1.0 to avoid negative log values) on zero-one dummies for each of the 30 comics and 22 of the 24 grades ("poor" is the left out group and we observe only one "mint" condition comic so it is removed). We also include a dummy to designate observations from the 2001 sample. The sample is restricted to issues which sold. Coefficients of the grade dummies are reported in Table 3 . As shown there, the price increases monotonically with the claimed grade and the estimated price differences are substantial with "near mint" books selling for over 200 times the price of those in "poor" condition. Prices tend to be about 14% higher in the 2002 sample. With an adjusted R of .928, it is clear that most price differentials 2 are explained by the issue and the book's claimed grade.
Using the estimated values of each comic from this regression, we then form the ratio of the seller's minimum bid to this estimated value resulting in the RELATIVE_MIN_BID variable. This ratio averages 58.9% and the median is 39.8%. There is considerable variation. In almost one third of the auctions (32.6%) the minimum bid is 10% or less of the estimated value while in 11.9% the minimum bid exceeds the estimated value (69% of the later failed to sell). Not surprisingly, since a secret reserve price represents a secret minimum bid, the public minimum bid is much lower when the auction includes a secret reserve price.
The average minimum bid on issues with a reserve price is 20.1% of the predicted price versus 75.0% on issues without a secret reserve price. In general, we expect the number of bidders to fall as RELATIVE_MIN_BID increases but we also include the square and cube of this term to capture likely nonlinearities. 3 In addition to setting a minimum bid, sellers in an eBay auction may for a small fee also set a secret reserve price. Both the theoretical and empirical literatures are mixed on how such reserve prices impact the price received. According to Vincent (1995) , a secret reserve price essentially injects an additional bidder and (as opposed to a public minimum bid) has the advantage of not revealing to bidders the seller's evaluation of the asset's value thus resulting in a higher price. On the other hand, Li and Tan (2000) predict that in an independent private value framework, it should make no difference whether the seller's reserve price is known or not. Empirically, Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003) conclude that reserve prices raise the price received in eBay coin auctions causing them to wonder why more sellers don't use them. In contrast Dewally and Ederington (2006) and Katkar and Lucking-Reiley (2000) find that secret reserve prices lower the price. As noted above, Livingston (forthcoming) finds that the propensity to bid is significantly higher when a reserve price is present while Lucking-Reiley et al (2000) and Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003) find no significant impact.
Despite the previous evidence that reserve prices either increase or have little impact on the number of bidders, we see a couple of reasons secret reserve prices might discourage bidders. First, questions of trust and disclosure are important in this market due to the information asymmetry. A seller's failure to fully disclose their reserve price may be taken by potential buyers as a signal that they are likely withholding other information as well. Second, sellers with no intention of selling may run an auction with a very high secret reserve to gauge the market and estimate the comic's value. After observing the bids received, the sellers can then decide whether they want to run a second auction with a more reasonable minimum.
Although Ebay seeks to prohibit such behavior, the seller may also contact the highest bidder directly and 4 attempt to negotiate a higher price. Fearing such behavior, bidders may decide that it is not worth the time and expense to formulate a bid when they see a secret reserve price. Since there are thousands of comics and 24 quality grades, estimating the value of a comic and formulating a bid consumes time. When there is a secret reserve price, a prospective bidder may decide bidding is not worth the effort and turn to auctions without secret reserve prices. To test for such behavior, we include a zero-one dummy, RESERVE, in our bidder regressions expecting a negative coefficient.
When setting up an auction on eBay, the seller can choose to run the auction for 3, 5, 7 or 10 days.
While intuitively longer auctions should attract more bidders, much bidding occurs in the final hours and minutes. Indeed, neither Houser and Wooders (2006) nor McDonald and Slawson, Jr. (2002) find any evidence the auction length impacts the price. However, both Lucking-Reiley et al. (2000) and Dewally and Ederington (2006) find that longer auctions result in higher prices. Even if they wait until the end to actually bid, the number of potential bidders who are aware of the auction should be an increasing function of the auction length. To test for this, we include zero-one dummies, D5, D7, and D10 to designate 5, 7, and 10 day auctions respectively so 3 day auctions are the left-out category. We expect D10's coefficient to exceed D7's which should exceed D5's.
Bidders and Signaling.
We also expect the number of bidders to depend on signals of the issue's quality and the seller's reliability. It is often claimed that a big reason for eBay's success is their feedback system. Obviously information asymmetry is a problem in online markets since buyers are buying from strangers and cannot personally examine the items. Online buyers may well wonder whether the item is of the quality claimed and whether the seller will follow through particularly given the frequent charges of internet fraud. By constructing a system in which sellers and buyers rate their satisfaction with the counter party's performance, eBay both provides a means for bidders to judge the seller's reputation and an incentive for sellers to provide good, honest service.
The impact of these feedback ratings on the price is one of the most studied topics in the online auction literature. Studies fairly consistently find that, ceteris paribus, sellers with established, positive reputations receive higher prices than those without but estimates of the impact of feedback ratings on the price vary widely and in several it is slight (Bajari and Hortaçsu, 2004) . However, as Melnik and Alm (2005) point out, in most studies the item being auctioned is fairly homogeneous and of known quality.
They find that when there is more uncertainty about the condition of the item up for sale (as is the case here), reputation matters more.
Feedback ratings have limitations. Since sellers can start over with a different identity, they have an incentive to defraud customers after building up positive ratings. Consistent with this, Bolton et al (2004) find that buyers put less trust in feedback ratings from strangers than in their own experience with sellers.
An unsettled question is whether these feedback ratings affect the willingness of potential buyers to bid or just the price they are willing to pay when they do bid. If bidding entails time and effort, buyers may decide not to bid if the seller has a poor or meager feedback rating. If bidding is costless, they may lower their bids but go ahead and bid. Accordingly, we test whether the number of bidders is related to the feedback rating of the seller. While most price studies include the numbers of positive and negative feedbacks as separate independent variables, we follow Dewally and Ederington (2006) in separating the impact of the feedback numbers into measures of 1) how much bidders know about the seller and 2) whether what they know is good or bad. To measure whether a seller's reputation is good or bad, we use the percent of negative feedbacks. Specifically, NEG_PCT = (the number negative feedbacks) / (n+1) where n is the total number of positive and negative feedbacks. The 1 is added to the denominator to avoid dividing by 5 zero in the case of first time sellers. By this measure, a large majority of sellers have quite positive reputations. NEG_PCT averages only .54% in our sample and is zero for more than half. To measure how much bidders know about the seller, we include a proxy for the standard deviation of NEG_PCT. For a given population of bad experiences, the standard deviation of the sample proportion is roughly proportional to the reciprocal of the square root of the number of feedbacks (Dewally and Ederington, 2006) . (2004), we expect the number of bidders to be negatively related to both NEG_PCT and STD_DEV.
One finding of Bolton et al (2004) is that buyers put more weight on personal experience with sellers than they do on feedback ratings from strangers. However, building personal experiences with the thousands of sellers on sites such as eBay is impractical. Third-party certification of the quality of the item is a possible partial solution. Unlike the sellers, certification agencies have no incentive to lie about an item's quality and the costs to their reputation are serious. Certifying agencies are common in financial markets where auditors, investment bankers, and bond rating agencies all perform this role and are now becoming common in online markets. In the comic book market Comics Guaranty LLC (hereafter CGC) grades and certifies comic books for fees ranging from $20 to $55. However, it is important to note that 6 CGC only certifies the quality of the comic book. A seller could still fail to deliver. Dewally and Ederington (2006) estimate that on average certified comics sell for approximately 50% more than noncertified with the same claimed grade with the certification premium rising with the claimed grade. To test whether certification impacts the number willing to bid for an item, we define CERTIFICATION = 1 if the comic is certified by CGC (28.4% of our sample) and 0 if not. The hypothesis that certification attracts more bidders implies a positive coefficient.
Sellers may also attempt to attract bidders by offering buyers a money back guarantee if dissatisfied.
However, Dewally and Ederington (2006) find that such warranties have no discernible impact on the price and hypothesize that this is because potential buyers view the warranties as costly or impossible to enforce. Nonetheless we test for a possible impact on the number of bidders by including the dummy WARRANTY=1 if a money back offer is included (15.3% of our sample) and 0 if not. We also include the variable NOSCAN if the seller fails to provide a scan of the issue (3.4%). We anticipate a positive coefficient for WARRANTY and a negative coefficient for NOSCAN.
Other Variables.
We also anticipate that the number of bidders could depend on the expected price of the comic.
Given the relatively fixed costs of bidding in terms of time and the fixed costs of shipping in terms of money, we expect less interest in low price/value comics. On the other hand, many collectors may simply be financially unable to enter market for very expensive comics. In 9.48% of our auctions, the predicted price based on the issue/grade regression in Table 3 exceeds $1000. We expect interest in such issues to be limited. Consequently we expect the number of bidders to be a humped function of the predicted price -first rising with the predicted price and then falling. To test this, we include both PREDICTED_PRICE, which is the estimated price based on the regression in Table 3 , and PREDICTED_PRICE as independent variables. 2 Since bidding interest may change over time, we include a zero-one dummy, 2001_SAMPLE, to designate observations from the earlier, i.e., 2001. sample. Finally, there may simply be more buyer interest in some issues than others, e.g., more interest in Spider-man than Silver Surfer. To test this, we include zero-one dummies to represent each of the 30 issues listed in Table 1 . The regressions are run both with and without these 30 dummies.
Estimation Procedures.
The regressions are estimated using both ordinary least squares and the Poisson count regression model. Ordinary least squares results have the advantage of easy interpretation, e.g., a coefficient of 1.2 on a zero-one dummy variable implies that, ceteris paribus, an average of 1.2 more bidders are observed when this variable takes a value of one. However, since the number of bidders takes only integer values, the normality assumption does not hold. Consequently, we also estimate a Poisson count maximum likelihood model, which maximizes the likelihood that the number of bidders is equal to the number actually observed assuming a Poisson distribution.
Bidder Results.
Results are presented in Table 4 . As shown there, although the scales differ, the results of the OLS and Poisson count regressions are quite similar. Since the results of the OLS regressions are easier to interpret, we focus most of our discussion on those. Adjusted R s vary from .67 for the OLS regression 2 without issue dummies to .71 for the Poisson regression with issue dummies.
According to the estimates in Table 4 , the presence of a secret reserve price lowers the number of bidders by approximately 1.5 to 1.6. Since the mean number of bidders is only 5.05, this represents a substantial reduction. As explained above, we see two possible explanations. One, this is a market which relies on trust and transparency. Potential buyers may suspect that if the seller is withholding information about what price she will accept, she is likely withholding information about the comic's quality or condition as well. Two, potential bidders may suspect that sellers are conducting a sham auction to gather information on demand for the item by setting a very high secret reserve price. Since it is possible the item will not be sold, given the time costs of formulating and submitting a bid, potential bidders may decide it is not worth the effort. Bajari and Hortaçsu (2004) question why more sellers don't set secret reserve prices. Our finding that they scare away bidders provides an explanation. Indeed, combined with the price results in Dewally and Ederington (2006), our results raise the question why so many (29.4% in our sample) do. Of course, one possibility is that they do not recognize that secret reserves scare away bidders. Another, is that, as just hypothesized, many sellers are using this mechanism to test the market, i.e., they set a very high reserve and after viewing the results decide to 1) contact the highest bidder and negotiate a higher price, 2) re-auction the comic with a more reasonable reserve price, or 3) keep in their collection. Table 4 imply that a rise in the percentage of negative feedbacks from 0% to 3% (3.8% of the sample have negative feedback percentages 3% or higher) leads to an estimated decrease in the number of bidders of between .15 and .18. Assuming no negative feedbacks, a increase in the number of positive feedbacks from zero to ten leads to an estimated increase of .20 to .23 additional bidders and a further increase in positive feedbacks to one hundred adds about .06 to .07 more bidders. So while statistically significant, the impact of seller reputation on the number of bidders is relatively modest. Of course this may be partially due to the fact that very few sellers in our sample have poor reputations. For example only 1.3% have negative feedback ratios above 5%. Failure to provide a scan scares away an average of about .5 bidders while offering a money back guarantee tends to attract .23 to .35 additional bidders.
Our evidence indicates that longer auctions attract more bidders. Although only the dummy for ten day auctions is individually significant at the .01 level, the coefficients increase monotonically as one moves from 3 day to 5 day to 7 day and finally to 10 day auctions and the three are significant as a group at the .01 level. Ten day auctions tend to attract an average of about .6-.7 more bidders than three day auctions. Thus although bidding tends to be concentrated in the last few hours and minutes, a longer auction does seem to have the advantage of causing the item to be noticed by more potential buyers.
As expected, the number of bidders is strongly related to the minimum bid. Over reasonable values of RELATIVE_MIN_BID (e.g. between 0 and 1.5) the implication is that the number of bidders declines as the relative minimum bid is increased. Results for PREDICTED_PRICE and PREDICTED_PRICE_SQ depend on whether or not issue dummies are included in the regression. When issue dummies are excluded, these variables are significant and imply that the number of bidders increases with the expected price until the price reaches about $20,000. However these coefficients are small and insignificant once issue dummies are included suggesting that they are proxying for buyer interest in particular issues. Coefficients of the issue dummies are not reported in Table 4 . The estimated difference between the issue attracting the most bidders, Amazing Adult Fantasy 15, a key Silver Age issue in which Spider-Man makes his first appearance, and the issue attracting the least, Silver Surfer 2, is about 3.5 bidders.
In summary, there is strong evidence that adding a secret reserve price discourages bidders while obtaining third party certification attracts more bidders. There is also evidence that sellers with established positive reputations attract more bidders than sellers with nascent or negative reputations and evidence that longer auctions attract more bidders. The finding that reserve prices scare away bidders and that third party certification attracts them, indicates that bidders strongly prefer fully transparent auctions in which all parameters are known.
Bidders and Prices.
Next we explore how the entry of an additional bidder impacts the price received by the seller. As explained above, if (1) comics book auctions are common value auctions, (2) bidders know how many other bidders they are bidding against, and (3) bidders recognize and adjust for bidder's curse, then the final auction price should not vary with the number of bidders as long as there is at least one competing bidder. If in a common value auction, individual bidders do not adjust their bids as the number of bidders increases, then the expected value of the high bid will increase with the number of bidders since it is being drawn from a larger sample. However, the likelihood that an individual bidder has overestimated the value of the item given that they win the bidding also increases with the number of bidders. If bidders recognize this winner's curse effect, then they should lower their individual bids as the number of bidders increases, offsetting the impact of the additional bidder on the expected winning bid price.
Violation of any of the three assumptions listed above could cause the number of bidders to positively impact the price. Comic books could have a private value component. If for instance, a collector specializes in Silver Surfer comics and a copy of issue #4 would complete his collection, then that comic may be more valuable to that collector than to the mass of collectors and traders. In this case, an increase in the number of bidders increases the expected price since it increases the sample of private values from which the highest is drawn. Likewise, if comics are common value items but bidders fail to recognize and adjust for winner's curse, then the price will rise as the number of bidders increases.
A third possibility is that comic books are common value items and bidders recognize and try to adjust for winner's curse but do not have full information. In an online auction, It is difficult for a bidder to determine the number of competing bidders. Some bidders wait until the final minutes of the bidding to submit their bids in order to keep this information from competitors. Specifically, about 50% of sampled eBay auctions receive bids in the last 5 minutes and 37% in the last minute. Bidders sometimes hire a service to submit their bids seconds from the auction close. Moreover, early bidders may drop out once the price has risen. In this situation, we hypothesize that individual bidders will make their winner's curse adjustment based on the expected number of competing bidders. An unexpectedly higher (or lower) number of bidders should then cause the price to rise (fall).
Structure of the regressions.
We test the impact of additional bidders on the price received by regressing the price received in online comic auctions on the number of bidders, BIDDERS, and on a series of variables which we hypothesize should influence what individual bidders are willing to pay. A variable might influence the price received by the seller either: 1) by impacting the number of bidders and/or 2) by impacting what individual bidders are willing to pay. Since the number of bidders is one of the independent variables in our price regression, (assuming our specification is correct) the coefficients of the other independent variables should estimate their impact on the price holding the number of bidders constant, i.e., their impact on what individual bidders are willing to bid. We would expect many variables which were included in the bidder regressions in Table 4 to also impact what individual bidders are willing to pay. For instance, if issue A is more sought after or popular than issue B, we would expect both the number of bidders and what bidders are willing to bid to be higher for A. Likewise we would expect third-party certification, which as we have seen attracts more bidders, to also impact what individual bidders are willing to bid. On the other hand, we would expect the length of the auction to impact only the number of bidders. And we would expect the claimed grade to have more impact on the level of individual bids than on the number of bidders. Table 3 , our dependent variable is the log of the price (or the highest bid when the item fails to sell due to a secret reserve price) and, as in the Table 3 regressions, we include the 30 issue dummies and the 22 dummy variables for the claimed grade. For other independent variables, we draw on the results in Dewally and Ederington (2006) . The CERTIFICATION dummy is included to designate issues whose claimed quality grade is certified by Comics Guaranty LLC. Since third party certification should mean more if the claimed grade is high, we also include an interaction dummy CERT_GRADE which is equal to the coefficient of the claimed grade from Table 3 if the issue is certified by CGC and zero otherwise. The hypothesis that bidders are willing to pay more for certified comics regardless of the claimed grade implies a positive coefficient for CERTIFICATION while the hypothesis that they are willing to pay more for certification when the claimed grade is high implies a positive coefficient for CERT_GRADE.
As in
We include the two reputation variables NEG_PCT and STD_DEV. The hypothesis that bidders are willing to bid more for comics offered by sellers with positive reputations implies a negative coefficient for NEG_PCT . The hypothesis that bidders are willing to pay more the more certain they are of the seller's reputation (whether positive or negative) implies a negative coefficient for STD_DEV.
We include the WARRANTY variable to test the hypothesis that bidders are willing to pay more if the seller offers a money back guarantee. A positive coefficient is predicted. The variable NOSCAN is included to test the hypothesis that bidders reduce the price they are willing to pay in those rare instances when a scan is not provided which implies a negative coefficient. Finally, we include the variable RESERVE to designate issues on which the seller sets a secret reserve price. By essentially adding an additional bidder (to those measured by our BIDDERS variable), reserve prices might achieve higher prices all other things equal. On the other hand, it is conceivable that because they dislike the lack of transparency, bidders might lower what they are willing to bid on auctions with secret reserve prices. If so, then the presence of a secret reserve price might impact what bidders are willing to pay as well as their willingness to bid implying a negative coefficient. Finally we include a dummy, 2001_SAMPLE, to denote observations from the 2001 sample since prices might rise or fall between the two sample periods.
Sample Selection Issues
Testing how the price depends on the number of bidders, the reputation variables, and such seller controlled variables as RESERVE and WARRANTY, is complicated by the fact that some auctions do not result in a sale either because no one was willing to bid above the public minimum bid price or because none of the bids exceeded the secret reserve price. The standard procedure in the literature for dealing with these sample selection issues is two staged. First, when the issue did not sell because no bid exceeded the secret reserve price, the dependent variable is calculated as what the winning bid would have been absent the reserve price, i.e., the second highest bid plus the standard increment. Second, there may be no sale and no bids because no one is willing to bid above the specified minimum bid. Because the minimum bid (unlike the reserve price) is observed, this is handled by estimating a Tobit regression with the minimum bid as the censoring variable. This is the standard procedure in the literature and that followed here.
Results: Bidders and Prices.
Results are presented in Table 5 in the column labeled "Model 1." To focus on the variables of interest, we do not report the coefficients of the 23 grade dummies and 30 issue dummies -most of which are significant. The coefficient of the number of bidders, BIDDERS, is highly significant indicating that each additional bidder is associated with an increase in the price received of approximately 2.3%. This is a considerable impact -particularly considering that many of the observed bidders may have only bid early when the price was low and withdrawn in the final stages of the bidding. These results indicate that either 1) comic book auctions are partially private value auctions, 2) that bidders fail to adjust for winner's curse, or 3) that bidders do not know how many competitors they are bidding against. It is also possible that BIDDERS is proxying for unobserved variables which influence the attractiveness of particular comics.
Results for some of the other variables are also interesting. As noted above, since BIDDERS is included in the regression, their coefficients should measure their impact on the price holding the number of bidders constant, i.e., their impact on what individual bidders are willing to bid.
The dummy for the presence of a secret reserve price is small and insignificant. This is interesting since, as we have seen, the presence of a secret reserve price sharply reduces the number of bidders. We argued above that the finding that a secret reserve price scares off bidders could be due to either of two causes: 1) that potential bidders fear the seller is simply using the auction to judge the market so has set an unreasonably high reserve, or 2) that potential bidders interpret a secret reserve price as indicating that it is likely that the seller is withholding other information about the comics value as well. The insignificance of the RESERVE variable in the price regression seems more consistent with the former interpretation. If the presence of a reserve price causes bidders to suspect that the seller is withholding other pertinent information, we would expect it to lower what individual bidders are willing to pay as well as their willingness to bid, so a negative coefficient would be expected. On the other hand if bidders fear that the seller is using a sham auction to judge the market, they would likely be unwilling to entail the cost of researching the value of the comic and formulating a bid. But, once they have researched the issue and formulated a bid, these sunk costs should not impact their bid price, so RESERVE should be insignificant in the price regression. The indirect impact of a secret reserve price on the auction price is substantial.
According to the regressions in Table 4 , a secret reserve scares off about 1.5 to 1.6 bidders which combined with the BIDDERS coefficient of .0232 implies a price reduction of about 3.5%.
While the CERTIFICATION dummy variable is insignificant, the variable CERT_GRADE representing the interaction of certification and grade is highly significant. The implication is that certification does not impact the price of a comic if the certified grade of poor or fair but does as the claimed grade rises. Specifically, the Model 1 estimates imply that certification raises the price of comics graded good by 17%, those graded very good by 28%, fine by 40%, very fine by 56%, and near mint by 89%. In the column labeled "Model 2" we change the measure of the number of bidders. Here we use the residual from the Poisson count model estimation in Table 4 to measure the number of "unexpected bidders"
given the characteristics of the issue which we label UNEXP_BIDDERS. The estimated coefficient of UNEXP_BIDDERS is even larger imply each additional bidder raises the price about 4.25%.
In summary, our results indicate that the price in an auction varies significantly with the number of bidders. We find that variables such as certification and reputation impact both potential bidders' willingness to bid and the prices they are willing to bid if they do but that their major impact on the price is due to their impact on the latter -the prices individual bidders are willing to bid. However, a secret reserve price has the opposite pattern, that is, it strongly reduces the number of bidders but has little impact on what each is willing to bid.
Conclusions
Using data from eBay auctions of classic comic books, we have explored what attracts bidders to online auctions and the impact of additional bidders on the price. We find that over 70% of the variation in the number of bidders across different auctions is predictable based on characteristics of the issue, the seller, and the auction design. Not surprisingly, high minimum bids discourage more bidders and longer auctions attract more.
Importantly we find that the presence of a secret reserve price tends to reduce the number of bidders in an online auction by about 1.5 to 1.6 bidders, we propose two possible explanations. The first is that potential buyers fear that the seller has likely set an unreasonably high reserve price in order to gather information on the item's market value with no intention of selling so reason that it is not worth the cost of researching the likely value of the comic and formulating a bid. The second is that potential bidders interpret a seller's unwillingness to make his minimum bid public as a signal that the seller is likely withholding other important information about the comic as well so again are reluctant to bid.
We further find that obtaining third party certification of the claimed grade attracts roughly one additional bidder on average and that a positive well-established seller reputation attracts more bidders.
We find that each additional bidder tends to increase the auction price by about 2.3% to 4.2% suggesting that either: 1) comic books have different values to different bidders, i.e., a private value component, 2) comics books are common value items but some bidders fail to recognize and adjust for winners curse, and 3) bidders try to adjust for winners curse but cannot accurately estimate the number of bidders.
Finally we find that while variables such as third party certification and seller reputation impact both how many bidders bid in an auction and how much individual bidders are willing to bid, their major impact on the price is via their impact on how much individual bidders are willing to bid. The presence of a secret reserve price is the exception to this rule. It impacts the number of bidders but not what individual bidders are willing to bid. This is consistent with the hypothesis that there is a cost to researching the value of a comic and formulating a bid so that if potential bidders fear a reserve price is likely unreasonably high they may choose not to bid. However, once they have incurred the cost of formulating a bid, this cost is sunk so does not impact the bid price. The log of the auction price (or highest bid if a secret reserve was not met) is regressed on characteristics of the comic book, seller, and auction using a Tobit estimation procedure with the log of the minimum bid as the censoring variable. Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. * and ** denote coefficients which are significantly different from zero at the .05 and .01 levels respectively. Not shown are coefficients for dummies for the 23 claimed grades listed in Table 3 and the 30 issues listed in Table 4 .
Variable
Model 1 Coefficients
Model 2 Coefficients
Number of bidders (BIDDERS) .0232** (.0015)
Number of unexpected bidders (UNEXP_BIDDERS)
. 
